Affect vs. Ideology

One of the cornerstones of critical pedagogy is practicing counterhegemonic movements. The concept of hegemony as a component of political power emerged in the work of Antonio Gramsci. He believed it was the ruling classes promotion of cultural norms, behaviors, and desires that led to working classes' acquiescence of their oppression. For him, it answered why they supported the rise of fascism in Italy. His theory inspired the Birmingham School and the burgeoning field of cultural studies, which looked at how messages were decimated to the masses and reified norms and practices. For them it answered the question of why the British working class supported Margaret Thatcher. Later, American academics would apply the same causality to the election of Ronald Reagan.

Deleuze explains the acceptance and participation in fascism as related to Spinoza's concept of  "conatus, this being an innate tendency towards self-preservation which involves a determination to act on affectations however they are experienced or conceived through body or mind, through superstition or reason (E II, P9, S; E III, def.) but in which, 'self-preservation' can become mobilized in all manner of distinct experiences of self, inaddictions, perversions and transformations" (Ruddick 35). Essentially, their desire of self-preservation primed their acceptance for the political perversion that was fascism. Conatus is one component of the larger field of affect theory, which builds upon the work of Baroch Spinoza.

Affect theory moves us beyond ideology. As Brian Massumi explains, "Affect holds a key to rethinking postmodern power after ideology. For although ideology is still very much with us, often in the most virulent forms, it is no longer encompassing. It no longer defines the global mode of functioning of power. It is now one mode of power in a larger field that is not defined, overall, by ideology. This makes it all the more pressing to connect ideology to its real conditions of emergence" (104). Massumi returns to the election of Ronald Reagan, but instead looking at hegemonic practices and messages, he looked at the affective appeal of Ronald Reagan the man.

Logically, Ronald Reagan was not the best candidate. He often fumbled in his speeches, which were at times incoherent. He's physical presentation was jerky and unpoised. However, as Massumi explains, "The two levels of interruption, those of linear movement and conventional progressions of meaning, were held together by the one Reagan feature that did, I think, hold positive appeal--the timbre of his voice, that beautifully vibratory voice" (102). Somehow, because he presented no coherent ideologies, he became an inscribable presence. Voters fill in the blanks of his disruptions and place them in their local context. "That is why Reagan could be so many things to so many people; that is why the majority of the electorate could disagree with him on every major issue, but still vote for him" (103). Also, people felt he projected an air of confidence.

The concept of confidence became a key factor in the Kerry/Bush election as noted by Lauren Berlant. It was an election arguably one by affect. Affect is, according to Spinoza, 'affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, helped or hindered, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections' (E III, Def. 3). As Berlant explains, "The Republican right paired an economic and imperial project with what Jameson calls a 'fantasy bribe'⁹: in this case the bribe was fantasy itself, the opportunity to keep fantasizing about the normative good life, authorized by the right-wing promise to maintain a vague scene and sense of normalcy (sharpened at one end by homophobia and, at the other, by the fear of economic and terrorist disaster)." More so, Kerry portrayed himself as a waffler who was unsure. The perception diminished people's desire to vote for him. Whereas those voters for whom Bush keyed in one key components of their values felt positive voting for him, even if they disagreed with some of his policies and actions. In these cases, affect seems more concrete, an impression that encounters individuals' affections, most of which are not consciously perceived or fully understood, and limits or encourages certain behaviors/reactions.

As explained by Massumi, the addition of affect doesn't dismiss ideology; however, it shows that ideology is just one component of a much larger picture.

Berlant, Lauren. "Unfeeling Kerry." Theory & Event 8.2. 2005. Web.

Massumi, Brian. "The Autonomy of Affect." Cultural Critique 31. Autumn 1995. 83-109. Print.

Ruddick, Susan. "The Politics of Affect: Spinoza in the Work of Negri and Deleuze." Theory Culture Society 27. 2010. Print.